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6.1  Introduction 
The main protagonists of the Cold War, the United  States and the Soviet 
Union, both “lost” the war to two trading and welfare states, Japan and Ger- 
many, whose leaders learned similar lessons from their disastrous involvement 
in  power  politics  in  the  first half  of  the  twentieth  century. Recent events 
in world politics have created historic changes in international politics com- 
parable in this century only to the years  1917-22  and  1947-53.  This paper 
argues  that Japan’s  future role in  the international  system will  be  affected 
deeply by a political regionalism in Asia that will supplement rather than re- 
place the US.-Japan relationship. Will that regionalism be constructed largely 
around bilateral political bargains involving Japan and its Asian neighbors? Or 
will these bilateral bargains be embedded in a set of multilateral regional and 
global arrangements that also include the United States? Drawn from the expe- 
riences of two Asian nations, Thailand and Indonesia, where issues of regional- 
ism have gained salience in the 1980s, evidence presented in this paper sug- 
gests that the answer to the first question is negative while the answer to the 
second is positive. 
Any interpretation of Japan as a regional power requires an examination of 
how its political system organizes and exercises power at home and abroad. 
This is an issue on which Japan specialists are deeply divided. A decade of 
charged political debate and dispassionate scholarly discourse has created a 
tenuous consensus that discards the two polar views that dominated discussion 
in the 1970s. Power in Japan is organized neither by a monolithic coalition of 
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business and government, “Japan Inc.,” nor by a pluralistic system of market 
competition. Instead during the last decade the various interpretations that spe- 
cialists have advanced stress the interaction between state and market, politi- 
cians and bureaucrats, social movements and political organizations in  what 
Richard Samuels has aptly called a system of “reciprocal consent” (Samuels 
1987). This consent balances the autonomy  of  the state against its embed- 
dedness in civil society. 
The behavioral consequences of this distinctive interaction between  state 
and society in domestic politics have differed for Japan’s industrial and political 
structures as well as for its public policies. Since 1945 Japan has succeeded 
in remaking its industrial structure twice, a feat not approached by any of the 
other advanced industrial states. At the same time Japan has been governed by 
the same political party without interruption since 1955, a record of political 
longevity that makes  it unique  among the world’s  major  democracies.  The 
flexibility of its industrial structure and the inflexibility of its political structure 
converge in a set of adaptable public policies. Energy and public spending are 
good examples. These two issues posed serious challenges to Japan and other 
states in the 1970s and 1980s. Through a number of deliberate policy choices 
in the 1970s Japan succeeded in establishing a foundation for future economic 
growth without increasing energy consumption. Likewise in the 1980s it suc- 
ceeded in curtailing dramatically its debilitating public deficit. 
The behavioral consequences of the distinctive interaction between state and 
society for Japan’s foreign affairs are also noteworthy. Japan’s approach to other 
states is marked by a great flexibility in how it calculates its interest and by a 
great inflexibility in how it conceives of Japan’s identity in a world of multiple 
norms. For example, Japan’s vulnerabilities in importing food and raw materi- 
als give rise neither to an urge for autarchy nor to a master plan for the world. 
Japanese policy elites believe firmly that Japan’s inherent vulnerabilities can be 
mitigated through clever maneuvers in markets-they  cannot be avoided. Thus 
what matters to  the Japanese is the construction of  vulnerabilities for other 
countries in areas of Japanese strength, such as manufacturing and technology. 
To date Japan’s international conduct is not governed by any grand vision but 
by  a sustained effort to reduce the enormous vulnerabilities it faces through 
altering the political leverage it has over other political economies, such as 
those in Asia. 
The  1980s have witnessed  a massive shift in relative power between the 
United States and Japan-exemplified  by the surge in both Japanese economic 
and technomilitary capabilities. And in Asia there are signs of a growing re- 
gional orientation fueled by greater economic interdependence and a relative 
decline in the U.S. economic position vis-l-vis the Japanese and the newly 
industrializing  countries  (NICs).  Japan  has  recently  surpassed  the  United 
States as the country with the greatest amount of total foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in Asia. And according to the Japan Foreign Trade Council, Asia over- 
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Table 6.1  Japan’s Economic Relations with Asia (billions of dollars) 










Aid  Trade  Investment 
1.307  26.5  1.81 
1,433  48.26  1.72 
777  29.49  .99 
1,364  13.30  .33 
-  36.93  2.35 
-  93.85  1.95 
2,177  53.19  2.00 
-  78.51  1.23 
FDI  in Asia, 1951-88 
Resource 
Country  Manufacturing  Development  Commerce  Others  Total 
ASEAN 
Thailand  1,456  38  416  82  1,992 
Indonesia  2,955  6,441  400  8  9,804 
Malaysia  1,350  179  294  11  1,834 
Singapore  1,990  5  1,744  73  3,182 
Hong Kong  492  33  5,515  127  6,167 
South Korea  1,589  21  1,506  132  3,248 
Taiwan  1,473  4  246  68  1,79  1 
China  349  48  1,575  64  2,036 
Rest of Asia  207  119  85  12  423 
Total  12,37  1  7,343  11,925  588  32,227 
Philippines  510  455  144  11  1,120 
NICs 
Source: Far Eastern Economic Review, May 3, 1990 (MITI and Ministry of Finance). 
Economic Review, July 25, 1991, 91). Much of this expansion in trade stems 
from the great increase in demand for Japanese capital goods in the wake of 
the rapid Japanese foreign investment expansion in Asia. Japan also provides 
more financial aid and loans to Asia than does the United States and is seeking 
an even greater role in the Asian Development Bank (Friedland 1988; Awano- 
hara 1991b). 
With the continuing strength of the Japanese economy and the revaluation 
of the yen after the signing of the 1985 Plaza Accord, Japanese investment has 
flooded into the ASEAN nations (table 6.1).‘ The accelerated pace of Japan’s 
economic involvement in the ASEAN nations built on an already significant 
Japanese presence developed since the end of World War 11. During the period 
1969-81, for example, 48 percent of ASEAN’s FDI  was from Japan, and from 
1972 to 1981 45 percent of aid to the region came from Japan (“Uneasy Neigh- 
1.  The ASEAN countries include Brunei, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and 
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bors” 1983,94). The importance of Japan as a source of technology, loans, and 
investment has grown even more dramatically over the past six years. The total 
amount of FDI in ASEAN originating from Japan between 1985 and 1989 was 
two times the total amount invested from 1951 to 1985 (do Rosario 1990,48). 
As this influx of capital continues, governments in the region are considering 
carefully the long-term implications of their relationship with Japan. Specifi- 
cally, they are exploring whether and how their relationship with Japan can 
be managed, restructured, or expanded. On  the one hand, Japan’s increasing 
economic involvement in the region has been encouraged by almost all govern- 
ments in Southeast Asia. There is no better proof of this encouragement than 
the liberalization  of economies  in the region and the  extension of  lucrative 
privileges to attract foreign investors for export promotion policies, as Richard 
Doner’s chapter in this volume illustrates. Furthermore, many ASEAN coun- 
tries have actively sought to emulate Japan’s model of development in both the 
private and public sectors. Many Thai and Malaysian businesses  have estab- 
lished trading companies, for example, and as Prime Minister Mahathir’s re- 
cent proposal for a trading bloc excluding the United States suggests, some 
ASEAN  politicians  and  bureaucrats  are  interested  in  even  greater  ties  to 
Japan.  * 
At the same time as ASEAN leaders observe a growing dependence on their 
northern neighbor, there is apprehension concerning their future relationship 
with Japan. The ASEAN nations have witnessed the winding-down of the Cold 
War in Europe and are uneasy about the potential unraveling of U.S.-Japanese 
security  arrangements,  a fear that  has  rekindled  memories  of  the  wartime 
Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.3  Some countries view economic inte- 
gration in Europe and America with growing trepidation, for it is difficult to 
envision a counterweight to Japanese power in Asia, were an Asian trading 
bloc to emerge in the near future, Most ASEAN nations  depend heavily on 
the United States and Europe for export markets, and ASEAN alone neither 
generates significant internal trade nor provides  adequate leverage against a 
Japan playing the role of  “regional hegemon.” The total GNP of the ASEAN 
nations is less than 10  percent of Japan’s, and significant economic cooperation 
among the  six  countries  is  virtually  nonexistent.  To  date ASEAN  remains 
largely a political grouping with  limited  success in fostering industrial and 
2.  See Machado (1987). In the early 1980s Mahathir, irked that large neon signs of  Japanese 
companies spoiled the view from his governmental palace, requested that the signs be turned off 
at night. After criminal activity increased sharply, however, he requested that the advertisements 
be relit. This is a small but revealing example of ASEAN dependence on Japan. 
3.  In Japan the right-wing nationalist Shintaro Ishihara openly talks of the recreation of  the 
Dai Toa Kyoei-ken, the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. In the 1991 July cover story of 
the Japanese journal  Sunsarru he writes: “Japan is now qualified to revive its global ideal, the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphcre, which had no chance before the War.”  He argues that 
Japan “has no need to have a military presence in Southeast Asia,” If other Asian countries resist 
Japan’s  leadership, “there are other ways to make them realize the consequences.” For example, 
“We can cut off the flow of technology.” See Doi and Willenson (1991, 6). 221  Japan as a Regional Power in Asia 
commercial cooperation. The January 1992 signing of an agreement to create 
an ASEAN free trade area over the next fifteen years represents one of the first 
significant steps toward greater economic cooperation. At present it remains 
much more of an ideal than a real it^.^ 
This paper seeks to understand Japan’s role as a regional power in Asia by 
analyzing Thailand’s and Indonesia’s policy toward Japan in section 6.2, exam- 
ining Japan’s role in the development of Thai and Indonesian infrastructure in 
section 6.3, and drawing some conclusions in section 6.4. 
6.2  Thai and Indonesia Policy toward Japan 
6.2.1  Case Selection 
Within ASEAN, Thailand and Indonesia offer important test cases for the 
study of the emerging political and economic contours of Japanese-led region- 
alism. By observing the recent policies these countries have adopted to deal 
with Japan, it is possible to explore the present and future dimensions of Japan’s 
role in Asia. A focus on Thailand and Indonesia is useful in several respects. 
Japan has historically been interested in both nations for markets and natural 
resources  such as oil. It colonized or indirectly ruled both countries during 
World War 11. Japan’s continuing interest in both political economies, further- 
more, is demonstrated by  the fact that Indonesia presently receives a greater 
share of Japanese foreign aid than does any other nation in the world (approxi- 
mately 11 percent of Japan’s bilateral aid) and is a top destination for Japanese 
capital in Asia (Schwarz 1990). Thailand is the fourth largest recipient of Japa- 
nese aid and has received substantially increased amounts of Japanese manu- 
facturing investment since 1985. Both countries are important strategically to 
Japan. Indonesia supplies Japan with  13 percent of its crude oil imports and 
53 percent of its natural gas. The rest of Japan’s oil imports pass through Indo- 
nesian waters. Because of its growing economy and its position in mainland 
politics,  Thailand is  viewed  by  the  Japanese  as the rising  star among the 
ASEAN  nation^.^ Both countries offer Japanese businesses large and growing 
4.  Proposals for a free trade zone among the ASEAN states have been justified to the public 
largely as a means of attracting greater foreign investment. The prime minister of Thailand, Anand 
Panyarachun, whose proposal was adopted January 28, 1992, has stated that “Japan, the U.S. and 
the E. C. would be more interested in investment following formation of a free trade area which 
would create a larger market’’ (Nation, August 3, 1991, B8).  The new trade accord allows numer- 
ous loopholes that exempt hundreds of products from the proposed tariff reductions. 
5.  The recent progress toward a peace settlement in Cambodia and the liberal investment cli- 
mates that have been created by the Laotian and Vietnamese versions of perestroika have led to a 
great expansion in the trade and investment opportunities in all three countries. The Thais hope 
that they will be well placed to take advantage of these new opportunities by  serving as a partner 
to  East Asian investors. Thailand’s greatest fear is that Japan may move directly into Vietnam, 
especially if the United States-led  embargo is lifted. There are growing indications that Japanese 
business is already dealing directly with Vietnam without using Thais as middlemen. Reportedly 
Japan is importing 80 percent of Vietnam’s crude oil and has opened unofficial trade offices in 
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Table 6.2  Country Profiles, Thailand and Indonesia 
Thailand  Indonesia 
Population (million) 
Population growth rate (%) 
Land area (square km) 
GDP (US$ billions 1989) 
Per capita GDP (US$) 
GDP growth rate (% per annum) 












































Sources: Asian Business,  February-March  1990;  Asian Development Bank (I 990) 
markets-Indonesia  with 178 million inhabitants, and Thailand with 56 mil- 
lion, with per capita incomes at US$504 and US$1,180, respectively (table 
6.2). Japanese officials and businessmen have a clearly demonstrated interest 
in expanding their influence in these nations. 
At the same time, these two countries are economically far behind Japan, 
and the amounts of aid and investment they are receiving from Japan are pro- 
portionally  highly  significant for the regimes of  both countries. Thailand’s 
GDP is 2 percent of Japan’s, and Indonesia’s is just under 3 percent. If, as some 
analysts suggest, the region is witnessing the emergence of a closed economic 
grouping (whether intentional or not), then it should be most evident among 
these dependent economies. In  this regard Thailand and  Indonesia can be 
viewed as important test cases for the hypothesis that Asia is an emerging, 
closed bloc. If there are few signs that these two smaller economies are trying 
to create, or are being drawn into, a closed bloc arrangement, however, this 
would cast doubt on the hypothesis of  a trend toward a closed economic re- 
gionalism in Asia. 
A focus on Thailand and Indonesia, specifically, is useful in that both coun- 
tries differ significantly in their geopolitical position, their domestic political 
systems, and their historical relationship with Japan. Yet  both are presently 
confronted  with  the  same  external  stimulus:  a  semicooperative Japanese 
government-business endeavor to promote and expand Japan’s economic and 
political presence within both countries, particularly in the area of infrastruc- 
ture investment. 
Examined in detail in section 6.3, infrastructure development policy is cru- 223  Japan as a Regional Power in Asia 
cia1 for several reasons. First, it presents the clearest bottleneck so far to further 
Japanese investment in both countries. Hence it is an impediment to further 
regional integration. Second, the solution to these bottlenecks involves more 
explicitly political rather than market arrangements. The provision of  infra- 
structure is closely tied to the political patronage systems in both Thailand and 
Indonesia. Japanese officials and businessmen are drawn into a political space 
held by the military, bureaucrats, politicians, and others. Many Thai and Indo- 
nesian officials have various political reasons for keeping infrastructure pro- 
curement the way it has been-disastrous  in terms of efficiency, but savvy in 
terms of the calculus of power. In short, Japanese attempts to promote infra- 
structure improvement, as outlined, for example, in MITI’s  1987 New  Asian 
Industries Development Plan (New Aid Plan), represent the best example to 
date of expressly political attempts by outsiders to influence domestic politics 
for the purpose of promoting greater economic integration in Asia. A funda- 
mental question then is the extent to which Japanese government and business 
officials are attempting to remold these two countries to suit their own pur- 
poses, and the extent to which Japanese initiatives are being modified by, or are 
seen as compatible or incompatible with, the interests of these two important 
regional actors. 
6.2.2 
Thailand’s and Indonesia’s responses to Japan over the last six years reveal 
some important similarities. They support the thesis that Japan is exerting in- 
creasing political and economic influence in both countries. Despite differing 
historical legacies at the hands of the Japanese-the  former Dutch East Indies 
were colonized during World War 11, while Thai leaders formed a tenuous al- 
liance  with  Japan-and  important  differences  in  domestic  political  and 
economic  structures-Thailand’s  political  economy  is  considerably  more 
market-oriented than Indonesia’s-both  countries have moved steadily to clear 
obstacles and provide incentives for dramatic increases in the levels of Japa- 
nese investment for export manufacturing. Japanese foreign investment in both 
Thailand and Indonesia now exceeds U.S. totals, and the Japanese far outstrip 
foreign investments in manufacturing by other countries (Sanger 1991b). Japa- 
nese businesses in both countries, largely through joint ventures with local 
partners, have created a crucial presence in sectors such as textiles, automo- 
biles, and electronics (Doner 1991). Why have both countries been so willing 
to open the doors to a flood of  foreign, particularly Japanese, investment? A 
brief review of foreign investment in Indonesia and Thailand helps in answer- 
ing this question. 
In the early 1960s both Thailand and Indonesia pursued import substitution 
policies with the participation of multinational corporations. Supply-side limi- 
tations on private international credit helped to create import-substitution strat- 
egies in much of the Third World, Thailand and Indonesia included. The fact 
that access to international capital could be obtained only through multina- 
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tional enterprises (MNEs) or development assistance required difficult choices 
as to the source of funds. 
In  Indonesia during the early  1960s Sukarno had  largely repudiated both 
MNEs and foreign aid as sources of capital. Hyperinflationary economic poli- 
cies, combined with a military buildup and conflict with Malaysia, however, 
helped precipitate the coup of  1965, which brought Suharto and the military 
to power. Suharto reversed many of  Sukarno’s policies in his New Order, in- 
cluding those concerning foreign investment and acceptance of development 
assistance (Anderson  1990). It  was during the  late  1960s that the Japanese 
established a growing presence both as investors behind high tariff walls and 
as foreign contributors to the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), 
which provides Indonesia with an annual block of foreign aids6  In 1974 a grow- 
ing perception that Japanese business was coming to dominate the Indonesian 
economy caused anti-Japanese riots in Jakarta.’ Between  1974 and  1984 the 
economy grew at an annual rate of 7 percent, largely as a result of Indonesia’s 
emergence during this period as a major exporter of oil and gas (Carey 1987). 
Much of the revenues obtained from the rise of oil prices in the 1970s funded 
government development projects such as the establishment of a shipbuilding 
and avionics industry as well as oil refineries and petrochemical plants. 
When the price of  oil collapsed in  1983, however, the Indonesian govern- 
ment faced a financial crisis, which it sought to stem by unraveling its import 
substitution strategies and by relying more heavily on foreign investors, partic- 
ularly the Japanese. Until  1983 the government had relied on sales of oil for 
roughly 60 percent of its revenue and 70 percent of the country’s foreign ex- 
change. Faced with the loss of this revenue the government was forced to turn 
elsewhere for development capital. Suharto began borrowing heavily from for- 
eign sources, mostly Japanese. Indonesia’s foreign debt increased from US$27 
billion in 1982 to US$51 billion in 1989 as a result of borrowing to meet the 
requirements  of  financing  public  development  plans  and  restructuring  the 
economy.8 It was with the purpose of assisting the Indonesian government in its 
efforts at privatization that the Japanese government announced an aid package 
amounting to US$2.3 billion at the end of 1988. It included for the first time 
“special  assistance,”  that is, quick disbursing  loans  and  program  aid (Eda- 
mura 1989). 
As a result of its increasing debt burden and the continuing low price of oil 
on  world  markets,  however, Indonesia  has  been  forced to  earn foreign  ex- 
6. The donor consortium, IGGI, provided the government with U.S.$S.75 billion in FY 1991. 
The Japanese, in this year as in the recent past, provided approximately half to two-thirds of  this 
total. It is also important to note that the Japanese government has never attempted to change this 
multilateral aid consortium. And  it has allowed the United States to retain significant influence 
over economic policy through the World Bank even when U.S. donations to IGGI have stagnated. 
7.  Another important target of the riots was a faction inside the Suharto regime, which could 
not be opposed directly. 
8.  The appreciation of the yen after 1985 and the devaluation of the rupiah also eroded Indone- 
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change through other means. One of the few ways of obtaining scarce foreign 
currency has been Indonesia’s increasing reliance on foreign investments for 
purposes of export promotion. Over the last ten years the Indonesian govern- 
ment has cleared away many tariff barriers. And it has actively promoted new 
foreign investment for export purposes while encouraging established MNEs 
to begin  production for export (Hadiputranto  1988). For many  segments of 
society the policy  has  met  with  considerable  success. Nonoil  exports have 
grown at 26 percent per year since 1983, and nonoil manufacturing has been 
growing at more than  12 percent per year (“Suharto and the Reins of Power” 
1990, 38). But Indonesia’s ability to get its economy back on track has come 
at the price of increased dependence on foreign investment, particularly Japa- 
nese. Indonesia’s need for greater foreign investment to jump start its export 
industry coincided, especially after the  1985 revaluation of the yen, with the 
Japanese desire to provide capital. By the end of  1990 the Japanese had in- 
vested heavily in numerous sectors, with chemicals having received the most 
investment followed by banking, auto parts, machinery, and electrical goods 
(Tachiki 1990,3). Without foreign investors interested in producing for export, 
it is fair to say that Indonesia today might not have achieved its recent high 
levels of growth. 
A brief examination of Thailand’s recent political-economic history, and for- 
eign investment more generally, suggests a similar structure of incentives and 
constraints. Like Indonesia, Thailand adopted policies of import substitution 
in the early 1960s. When General Sarit obtained full authority over the govern- 
ment in his 1958 coup, he reversed previous policies of nationalizing various 
sectors of  the economy. In a move to cut back on foreign imports he raised 
tariffs while welcoming the investment of multinationals. Many foreign com- 
panies and local businesses applauded these policies: the government guaran- 
teed that it would neither nationalize companies a:  some future date no:  com- 
pete with the MNEs through state-run firms (Baldwin 1988, 109). 
More than 50 percent of the MNEs in Thailand were established between 
1963 and 1972 (Hewison 1987,56). Japanese automobile companies that had 
formerly exported cars to the Thai market, for example, linked up with local 
companies to build assembly plants behind new tariff walls. Similar investment 
took place in textiles. During this period most of the foreign investment capi- 
tal-besides  that of the MNEs-came  to Thailand in the form of World Bank 
loans as well as grants and military  aid from the U.S. government  (Suehiro 
1989,82-83).  As in Indonesia, the early 1970s were a period of public demon- 
strations against the growing Japanese presence in the economy. In November 
1972 Thai students with the support of some politicians organized a boycott of 
Japanese goods to protest the continuing imbalance of trade between the two 
countries. Though the boycott  itself  was unsuccessful, the Japanese govern- 
ment introduced a new,  lower-interest  rate loan  program, which it also ex- 
tended  to  other  nations  in  Asia  (Sueo  1988, 221).  Thailand’s  balance-of- 
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While retaining in some areas a policy of import substitution, in the 1970s 
Thailand’s policymakers began to move the economy toward a more export- 
oriented development ~trategy.~  This shift arose in part from the saturation of 
the domestic markets. More important, the change in policy was a response to 
the oil shocks of  the 1970s. A net importer of  oil, Thailand found itself- 
unlike Indonesia during this period-with  growing trade imbalances and in- 
creasing public deficits. With the worldwide increases in private loans through 
the recycling of  petrodollars, however, Thailand was able to borrow funds to 
cover these deficits. As Thailand’s debt service ratio began to climb precipi- 
tously after the second oil shock of  1979, the Thai government was pressured 
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMFj to initiate aus- 
terity measures (Hewison 1987, 75). Under austerity, massive public service 
programs were postponed and state-operated organizations, which in 1985 ac- 
counted for one-half of the government’s foreign debt, were forced to restruc- 
ture. Privatization of  several of  these organizations began,and public-private 
joint ventures were encouraged in several other cases. 
Thailand cleared the way for export promotion almost a decade before Indo- 
nesia. But in an attempt to attract greater amounts of  foreign investment, the 
government improved incentives for MNEs even further after 1986 (Rainat 
1988,32j. As in the case of Indonesia, and for similar reasons, Japanese invest- 
ment has become crucial to the success of Thailand’s export promotion over 
the last six years. Thailand has been able to reduce its foreign debt substan- 
tially, and its rate of industrialization has accelerated. Profits from manufac- 
tured exports have overtaken those earned traditionally from the export of rice. 
Thailand’s GDP growth rate over the last several years has been among the 
highest in the world. As in the case of  Indonesia, Japanese investment and 
Thailand’s policy toward it must be credited with much of the success of the 
economy during the late 1980s. Analysts claim that Japanese investment since 
1986 accounts for at least 1.5 percent of the annual increase in Thailand’s GNP 
(Tasker 1990,49). 
This brief overview of recent Thai and Indonesian economic development 
lends support to the hypothesis that Japan has indeed been acting as a regional 
economic hegemon, and that both countries have willingly supported this role. 
In reaction to the vagaries of the international marketplace, both Thailand and 
Indonesia have chosen to rely on the export interests and capabilities of mostly 
Japanese business to support their own as well as Japanese export promotion 
policies. While recent policies provide evidence that both governments have 
actively sought to encourage Japanese investment, there are indications that 
the nature of Thailand’s and Indonesia’s relationship with Japan may be under- 
going important changes, calling into question Japan’s role in further economic 
integration in Asia. 
9.  This change in  strategy is reflected in the third economic plan for  1972-76.  High tariff 
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Direction-of-trade statistics for both countries, for example, indicate that for 
the past thirty years Thailand has become steadily less dependent on Japan for 
its imports and exports while Indonesia has become more dependent (table 
6.3). Japan now accounts for a little more than one-tenth of Thailand’s export 
and import markets, whereas Indonesia has become dependent on Japan for 
one-quarter of its imports and two-fifths of its exports. Thailand has been very 
successful in diversifying its imports and exports to other developing countries, 
thus alleviating to some extent its dependence on Japan. On the other hand, 
because of its oil assets Indonesia has consistently run trade surpluses with 
Japan. Trading relations have been largely devoid of friction because of Japan’s 
willingness to accept this imbalance. In contrast, approximately 70-80  percent 
of Thailand’s trade deficit over the last several years, compared with the  10 
percent of Thailand’s trade with Japan, has been with Japan (“Cracks Begin to 
Develop” 1990). Thus trading relations between Thailand and Japan have be- 
come increasingly strained, as the Thai government perceives Japanese reluc- 
tance to open domestic markets to Thai rice and manufacturing exports. In this 
trade dispute the Thais have actively supported U.S. efforts to open Japanese 
markets. Other analysts and government officials, however, accept this trade 
imbalance. They point to the fact that most of Thailand’s Japanese imports are 
capital goods, which contribute to the overall industrialization of the country. 
In the area of debt Thailand has been quite successful in reducing its external 
vulnerability,  whereas  Indonesia’s  dependence-particularly  on  the  Japa- 
Table 6.3  Geographical Composition of Trade, Thailand and Indonesia 
Country 
Exports  Imports 
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nese-remains  very large. Thailand has succeeded in lowering its foreign debt 
service ratio from 22.3 percent in 1986 to 16.2 percent in 1990 (Asian Devel- 
opment Bank 1990, 245). One-third of Indonesia’s US$41 billion debt is held 
by Japanese creditors. This places Indonesia (and Tokyo bankers) in a vulnera- 
ble position (Schwarz 1990, 56). Indonesia’s foreign debt service ratio has de- 
clined from 43.7 percent in  1988 to 35 percent in  1990, but even this rate is 
well above the 20 percent level the World Bank deems manageable. 
Foreign investment is another area in which the two governments’ relation- 
ship with Japan may be changing. The East Asian economic boom has led to 
increased interest on the part of the NICs in investing in Thailand and Indone- 
sia. As a result of some of the same pressures driving the Japanese offshore, 
South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong have recently become major 
investors in both nations.1° This investment lends support to the notion of a 
growing regionalism  in Asia.  In the  long run, furthermore, it may free the 
hands  of  both  the  Thai and  Indonesian  governments.  Fearful  of  becoming 
overly dependent on the Japanese, other Asian economies may provide alterna- 
tive sources of investment and technology. The fear that the Japanese are ob- 
taining too much leverage in Thailand has recently led the Thai Board of In- 
vestment (BOI) to a shift in policy away from a continued reliance on Japanese 
business and toward the active promotion of other pools of investment capital 
in Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong (Handley  1991,43). The Indonesian 
government  at present is continuing to seek Japanese investment. But it has 
also begun  to look for greater investment  from other NICs and  the  United 
States (Mann 1990). Both countries are also actively encouraging technology 
transfers from the United States and the NICs, an area where leaders feel the 
Japanese have been remiss. Although the Thais may be attempting to gradually 
redirect investment sources away from Japan, such a shift may prove difficult. 
Because of Thailand’s relatively liberal investment climate and relatively plu- 
ralistic political system, Japanese MNEs will be able to pursue their interests 
with comparatively  greater freedom and less bureaucratic oversight than they 
have in Indonesia. The ability of Japanese investors to circumvent laws on for- 
eign ownership of property in Thailand is but one example of this freedom 
(Sricharatchanya  1987). 
It is difficult to characterize with certainty the future direction of Thailand 
and Indonesia’s relationship with Japan. Although with the encouragement of 
governments the Japanese have established a crucial presence in certain sectors 
of  both economies, there are signs that both countries are becoming aware of 
the perceived pitfalls of too heavy a reliance on their northern neighbor. At the 
same time Thailand and Indonesia are operating under various constraints. The 
10.  For a further discussion of NIC investment in Southeast Asia see “Give Me Your Huddled 
Hongkongers” (1989) and “ASEAN Prospects for Foreign Investment” (1990). At the end of 1989 
Hong Kong and Taiwan had invested a total of US$3.7 billion in Indonesia compared to Japan’s 
US$6.5 billion (Mann 1990). The investment ratios for Thailand are comparable. 229  Japan as a Regional Power in Asia 
need to export to service debts is very strong. And increasing technological 
dependence in a fiercely competitive global marketplace will also limit their 
room to maneuver. 
6.3  Japanese Role in Thai and Indonesian Infrastructure Development 
Arguably one of the most important policy issues likely to shape the two 
countries’ relationship  with Japan over the next several years is the area of 
infrastructure development. While the pace of Japanese investment in South- 
east Asia has grown tremendously over the last five years, there are signs that 
it may be tapering off. In  1990 Indonesia continued to receive a positive in- 
crease in the amount of Japanese investment, but Thailand showed no increase 
over the previous year. Investment applications during the first four months of 
1991 in Thailand were down 40 percent  (Bangkok Post, July 25, 1991, 16). 
One important reason for this slowdown is the inability of Thai and Indonesian 
infrastructures to support a continuation in the volume of Japanese investment. 
Foreign investors report that the main impediment to further investment in both 
countries is infrastructural bottlenecks  in  communications,  transport  (roads, 
ports), and services (“Looking at Indonesia’s Business Opportunities”  1990; 
Rim 1989). As recent accounts of the current situation in Eastern Europe indi- 
cate, it is very difficult to attract large foreign investment where infrastructural 
systems are inadequate. How the governments of Thailand and Indonesia deal 
with these problems will have a crucial impact on the future of Asian region- 
alism. 
In the late 1980s the Japanese stepped up their attempts to alleviate infra- 
structural bottlenecks in  Thailand and Indonesia, as well as in other Asian 
economies. This move supports the view that Japan has significant long-term 
interests in these countries and in Asian regionalism  more generally. Japan 
pledged to distribute US$50 billion over a five-year period ending March 3  1, 
1993. Thus far it has disbursed almost half this sum, mostly to Asian nations 
(Awanohara 1991a, 45). Much of this aid has supported major infrastructural 
projects aimed at alleviating serious deficiencies in communications, transport, 
and  power-generating  capacity  in  countries receiving  Japanese technology 
transfers and investment (“Japan’s Drive into Asia” 1989,5  1). 
More concretely, in January  1987 MITI unveiled in  Bangkok  a program 
known as the New Aid Plan, dealing specifically with the issue of infrastruc- 
tural difficulties in Asia and their relation to the developmental needs of Japa- 
nese industry and the restructuring of the Japanese economy in general (Brown 
1991). The program is an attempt to relocate selected Japanese businesses to 
Southeast Asia through loans and technical assistance to governments. These 
loans will be used for the improvement of infrastructure, including industrial 
estates, ports, and improved telecommunication  services. The New Aid Plan 
reflects MITI’s view that Japan must be prepared to meet the double challenge 
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to higher value-added production (“Yen Bloc Survey”  1989; Sricharatchanya 
1987). Various Japanese agencies, most importantly MITI, the Overseas Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  Fund (OECF), and the  Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, are 
attempting (with apparently significant interministerial conflict) to coordinate 
different aspects of  this plan, the details of  which are negotiated  bilaterally 
with each government. 
The New Aid Plan envisages four stages. First, Japanese loans support the 
development of roads, ports,  and other infrastructural supports. Second, the 
Japanese government  sends technical experts to assist in coordinating indus- 
trial plans for each country. Third, Japanese loans are extended to various in- 
dustries within participating countries. Finally, Japanese bureaucrats and busi- 
nessmen take steps to facilitate access to Japanese markets and to ensure the 
distribution of products imported from offshore factories to Japan (Wysocki 
1991). In short, the plan suggests that Japanese business and government elites 
view ASEAN (and the NICs) as one economy, requiring a comprehensive per- 
spective on aid, trade, and investment. The provision of  the necessary  infra- 
structure, as one part of this plan, will serve the interests of Japanese compa- 
nies and promote economic growth in Asia. The program is in some ways a 
continuation of previous Japanese policies toward Southeast Asia that focused 
on developing markets for Japanese goods and securing natural resources for 
Japanese industry. But the goals of the New Aid Plan depart significantly from 
past policies in emphasizing the extent to which the Japanese are seeking to 
take on a more prominent role in regional economic integration.” 
Japanese bureaucrats have thus  mapped out a comprehensive strategy for 
the future. But it is far less certain whether this plan will be heeded by Japanese 
business, and how it will be received in Bangkok and Jakarta. The Thai govern- 
ment agreed in  1988 to work with the New Aid Plan and established a joint 
steering committee with Japanese officials and businessmen to map out a fu- 
ture program of  industrialization (“Yen Bloc Survey” 1989, 13). Several Japa- 
nese bureaucrats are presently working side by side with planners in Thai gov- 
ernment ministries, and various  agencies are attempting to coordinate these 
activities. The Indonesians have yet to formally sign on, but there is both pres- 
sure from the Japanese and interest from some sectors of the Indonesian gov- 
ernment. 
The implementation of the New Aid Plan will undoubtedly be affected by 
Japan’s Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). It is often argued that Japa- 
nese aid cannot further larger Japanese objectives favoring business since aid 
typically is made on the “request principle.” It dates back to the early postwar 
period, when the Japanese government paid reparations to Indonesia and other 
11.  U.S. aid agencies have responded to the New Aid Plan by  altering their own policies. 
They now extend more mixed credits to four countries-Thailand,  Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Pakistan-in  which they perceive markets for infrastructure development to be “spoiled” by  the 
mixed credit advantages extended by  Japanese aid agencies to  Japanese firms. See Awanohara 
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Asian nations for projects that were specifically requested by  the governments 
(Kunihiro 1990). This policy continues today. Nevertheless, what governments 
in both Thailand and Indonesia request from Japanese aid officials often coin- 
cides fortuitously with the needs of  Japanese multinationals on whom these 
same governments depend for tax revenues and technology transfers. An ex- 
tremely  small and powerful  number of  indigenous business conglomerates 
dominate the economies in both Thailand and Indonesia.I2  These conglomer- 
ates wield enormous power over government and Ze  partners with numerous 
Japanese multinationals (Kunio  1988; Phongpaichit  1990; Suehiro  1989). 
They have  a direct stake in getting governments to push through requests 
congenial to the interests they  share with  their Japanese business partners. 
Moreover, through  personal  networks  Japanese partners are  often  able to 
steer through the intricacies of  Japanese ODA procedures with considerable 
ease. 
Thus it should come as no surprise, for example, that much of the recent 
Japanese ODA has gone to the alleviation of traffic congestion in Bangkok and 
Jakarta where Japanese auto assemblers dominate the market. Loans for the 
alleviation of rural poverty, on the other hand, are infrequent. The fact that the 
projects requested happen to benefit Japanese subsidiaries and their compara- 
tively wealthy, car-driving customers is no coincidence. It is likely that Thai- 
land and Indonesia would refuse to accept aid if  the Japanese designated the 
use to which it should be put. Nevertheless, the explanation that aid is “re- 
quested” must be interpreted within the context of transnational coalitions of 
powerful business interests. Indeed, the Japan Federation of Economic Organi- 
zations (Keidanren) continually promotes a growing role for the private sec- 
tor-both  in Japan and abroad-in  determining the developmental needs of 
ODA recipients. It implicitly acknowledges this pattern of “request” assistance 
and decries the lack of “efficiency” in some of the development projects car- 
ried out by the Japanese government. 
The Japanese government has extended its assistance in the building of in- 
dustrial infrastructure, such as electric power, telecommunications, roads, 
railways, and port facilities. However, we believe that the scope of such as- 
sistance should be extended to areas that will support industrial moderniza- 
tion, such as information processing, in line with the development needs of 
the recipient countries. . . . Efforts to  encourage private-sector investment 
and lending should emphasize the development of  an improved investment 
environment in the recipient countries. This includes such areas as infra- 
structure development, privatization, improved legislative frameworks, pro- 
tection of intellectual property rights and tax incentives. (Keizai Koho Cen- 
ter 1988) 
12.  The one major difference, however, is that in  Thailand the economy is dominated by  a 
Sino-Thai bourgeoisie  with political power (through parties), whereas in  Indonesia the  private 
sector, which is smaller than the  state sector, is dominated by Sino-Indonesians dependent on 
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But nowhere in this four-page brief  is there mention of rural or urban pov- 
erty. 
The extent  to which  the Thais and Indonesians  are welcoming  Japanese 
involvement in their infrastructure improvement via the “request principle” re- 
veals the extent to which Japan will succeed in creating greater regional and 
economic integration. However, infrastructure development such as construc- 
tion of ports, industrial estates, and telecommunication  services involves sec- 
tors of the economy that, by their very nature, are close to the core of state 
sovereignty and political patronage. They typically resist the kind of intrusive 
interventions of local and foreign planners  alike. The provision  and care of 
infrastructure in both Thailand and Indonesia are handled by state-run agen- 
cies, which are typically intertwined with patronage networks and the military. 
This adds a highly political element to efforts for improving economic infra- 
structures. Elites and political coalitions in both countries are increasingly di- 
vided between the need to privatize and deregulate these agencies to improve 
their country’s infrastructure on the one hand, and a desire to hold on to them 
for political reasons on the other. There is also uncertainty as to whether priva- 
tization is indeed the best means for upgrading infrastructure. And the issue of 
who wins and who loses under privatized infrastructural agreements continues 
to vex policymakers.  The hard truth remains,  however, that the high growth 
rates  Thailand  and  Indonesia  have  enjoyed  during the  last  decade, and  on 
which military regimes have staked their claim to legitimacy, will increasingly 
hinge on their ability to improve infrastructure. How and whether infrastruc- 
ture is upgraded will in turn influence the Japanese success in carrying out the 
New Aid Plan and its goal of inducing further Japanese investment in South- 
east Asia. 
Any analysis of the New Aid Plan must examine whether the intended re- 
sults of the plan are achieved and the means by which such ends are sought. In 
many cases the provision of infrastructure for the benefit of Japanese multi- 
nationals is more important than the means by which it is provided. It is thus 
possible to view Japanese policies as successful even if Japanese contractors 
are not part of the actual building  of roads and ports  and the improvement 
of telecommunication  services. A related issue is whether Japanese firms are 
allowed to participate in the design and building of infrastructure, a lucrative 
business considering  the large sums budgeted  recently  for infrastructure  in- 
vestment in both Thailand and Indonesia. Japanese participation  in the con- 
struction  of  roads,  ports,  and  industrial  estates is  as  notable  as Japanese 
involvement in the upgrading of antiquated telecommunication  services. 
Evidence from Thailand suggests that the Japanese have met with some suc- 
cess both in creating the types of infrastructures that will benefit Japanese mul- 
tinationals  and their partners,  and in obtaining  large contracts  for Japanese 
companies for building such infrastructure. Roughly 70 percent of Thailand’s 
ODA comes from Japan. And since the early 1980s, following  OECF funding 
guidelines, grant and aid loans have been used almost exclusively  for heavy 
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of  several irrigation projects in the north, most of these projects are concen- 
trated in and around Bangkok; the northeast, Thailand’s poorest region, has 
received little Japanese ODA (Thaitawat  1991). The new  Eastern Seaboard 
Project, a combination port, railroad, and industrial facility-designed  to shift 
investment away from congested Bangkok-has  been the most significant Jap- 
anese ODA project. It is financed by  soft loans from the OECF and built by 
Japanese contractors with the assistance of the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA; Handley 1988,69). The project makes use of plentiful supplies 
of  natural gas, recently discovered in the Gulf of  Thailand. It will provide 
cheap energy to those businesses relocating to new industrial parks. Energy- 
intensive Japanese businesses-particularly  those that might produce poten- 
tially dangerous environmental waste that would be intolerable in JapanI3- 
are being encouraged by both the Japanese and Thai governments to relocate 
to the new production site. One such project is a rare instance of  successful 
economic cooperation among the ASEAN nations. It involves a potash plant, 
funded by  the ASEAN governments and Japanese ODA, utilizing the facilities 
of the Eastern Seaboard Project. A second huge industrial project, the Southern 
Seaboard Development Programme, centers on a plan to create a pipeline sys- 
tem across the Kra Peninsula through which oil could be transported overland 
instead of being shipped through the Strait of  Malacca. The oil would be re- 
fined in one of the two ports on either side of  the pipeline before being sent 
to other Asian countries. Proposed by JICA, it is being designed by a consor- 
tium of engineering firms with a loan from the World Bank (Bangkok Bank 
1991). 
After a delay of several months following the February 1991 coup in Thai- 
land, the four government agencies responsible for Japanese ODA, the Minis- 
try of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, MITI, and the Economic Plan- 
ning  Agency, approved an  OECF funding package worth  84.7  billion  yen 
(US$685 million) for infrastructural development in Thailand for 1992. The 
bulk of  this aid is earmarked for infrastructural projects in and around the 
Bangkok area, such as viaducts on various trunk roads to alleviate the city’s 
traffic problems (“Tokyo Grants Aid to Thailand” 1991). The Thai government 
allocated upward of US$7.3 billion for infrastructure in 1991 (“Cracks Begin 
to Develop” 1990). These numbers show that Japanese funds account for about 
one-tenth of Thailand’s total infrastructure investment. 
In recent years there have been major problems with many of the projects 
in  Bangkok, due largely to a lack of  coordination among the various roads 
and mass transit projects as well as interministerial conflicts. In an effort to 
privatize the provision of  infrastructure, many of the contracts were awarded 
13.  With the unveiling of Japan’s “Green Aid Program,” to be headquartered in Bangkok, the 
Japanese have attempted to counter criticism that they are exporting the cost of pollution by setting 
up multinational operations of  energy-intensive production in Southeast Asia. The ODA program 
will grant aid totaling 750 million yen to Thailand for 1992  to fight industrial pollutants. The five- 
year program will provide US15  billion to Japanese ODA recipients. See “Tokyo Grants Aid to 
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to private  firms  under  the  democratically  elected  Chatchai  administration 
(1 988-91).  This circumvented the various public agencies charged with infra- 
structure development as well as the public sector labor unions, which opposed 
privatization. A political base of the military since the 1976  coup, these unions 
probably had the support of the military, which feared an erosion in its power 
because of these privatization  schemes. Prime Minister Chatchai was ousted 
in  1991 by  the military  on charges that he had received  kickbacks from the 
awarding of large infrastructure contracts to private industry. In the wake of 
the coup, and with the appointment of former diplomat Anand Panyarchun as 
prime minister by the military, many contracts for infrastructure development 
were renegotiated. However, public sector unions were abolished, clearing the 
way for an even brisker pace for privatization in the provision of infrastructure, 
in coordination with the government. Apparently even the military has realized 
the crucial importance of  upgrading Thailand’s infrastructure for continued 
economic development. 
The lack of coordination arising from Chatchai’s rapid privatization of infra- 
structure, without any government planning and regulation, suggests that the 
market may not be the best system for upgrading infrastructure. The recent 
return to greater state supervision over the planning of infrastructure is a hall- 
mark of the new military government’s first year in power. Prime Minister An- 
and has focused much of his energies on coordinating and renegotiating infra- 
structure contracts and attempting to root out the corruption blamed for the 
woeful state of Thailand’s infrastructure. Japanese willingness to extend huge 
loans for infrastructure development so soon after the coup-when  other coun- 
tries, notably the United States, have frozen aid contingent on steps toward the 
restoration of democracy-gives  tacit  approval to the military  government’s 
approach to the alleviation of infrastructural bottlenecks. 
Another important issue concerning infrastructural development is the ques- 
tion of who actually provides for its upgrading. There are presently more than 
seventy-two Japanese contracting companies in Thailand. With the continual 
opening of the door to foreign investment since the 1960s, Japanese contractors 
and engineering consultants have gained a reasonable share (2-4  percent) of 
the construction market, particularly for large projects such as the Eastern Sea- 
board Project. Japanese firms often form joint ventures  with Thai partners, 
but they also operate on their own. Recently, however, due largely to a report 
published in 1988 by the Institute for Developing Economies concerning Japa- 
nese ODA and the construction industry, local developers and some politicians 
and bureaucrats have challenged the tying of  Japanese aid for infrastructure 
to Japanese  contractors  (Chittiwatanapong,  Karasudhi,  and Itoga  1989). At 
an international conference on Japan’s ODA held in Bangkok in March 1991, 
Yochi  Aki, the OECF chief representative in Bangkok, refuted the notion of 
tied aid. He noted that the Japanese government-business relationship was no 
longer that close, and he cited statistics that showed that Japanese companies’ 
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a high of 67 percent in 1986 to 55 percent in 1987, and to 38 percent in 1989 
(Thaitawat 1991). In addition, Aki pointed out that by law the Thai government 
is obligated to accept the lowest bid for government projects, a stipulation that 
consistently favors Japanese contractors with easier access to low-interest  rate 
financing (“Cracks Begin to Develop” 1990). 
Nevertheless, the perception of Japanese dominance in the construction in- 
dustry, particularly in large and highly visible projects, has sparked attempts 
to diversify foreign project funding from the Japanese to more multilateral 
institutions such as the Asian Development Bank (Handley 1988). In a move 
that  suggests an  attempt to  diversify  away  from Japanese contractors, the 
Southern Seaboard Development Programme is being engineered with Japa- 
nese, Thai, and American participation (Bangkok Bank 1991). And the award- 
ing of the most recent contracts for infrastructural improvements in Bangkok 
to firms based in Canada (the Lavellin Skytrain) and Hong Kong (the Hopewell 
Expressway Expansion) is also a political attempt to diversify away from Japa- 
nese sources of capital and technology (Bangkok Post, August 8, 1991, 1). 
In  the case of  Indonesia, Japanese aid for the provision of  infrastructure 
is equally important. But participation by  Japanese contractors has been less 
significant, due to Indonesia’s generally more nationalistic policy toward for- 
eign participation in the economy. Until recently Japanese aid to Suharto has 
been intended to buttress the power of his dictatorship, thereby securing Japa- 
nese access to oil and investment in Indonesia. From 1988 to 1990 Indonesia 
received US$13 billion in aid-more  than half from Japan. In the category of 
special assistance-quick  disbursing, nontied  aid-Japan  has provided ap- 
proximately 70 percent of  late (Schwarz 1990). Soft loans from Japan’s OECF 
have financed an estimated 3  1 percent of Indonesia’s power-generating capac- 
ity, 1  I  percent of regional roads, 14 percent of railroads, and 46 percent of Ja- 
karta’s water supply (“Indonesia Shows Evidence” 1989). The OECF loans 
extended to Indonesia since 1968 have reached a cumulative commitment of 
approximately 1,300 billion yen, or about one-fifth of  the total OECF loans 
granted to developing countries. This makes Indonesia by far  the largest recipi- 
ent of Japanese ODA. The OECF program has covered more than four hundred 
projects, over one hundred in the transportation sector alone. They include 
many arterial roads and tollways, rehabilitation of railway track, and improve- 
ment  of  both  seaports and  airports. Power generation ranks  second, with 
eighty-five projects and a share of  29.5 percent of  total OECF project loans 
(“Indonesia Shows Evidence” 1989). These have included numerous hydro- 
electric dam projects, some of  which have drawn criticism from nongovern- 
mental organizations. Loans for this year will also fund a feasibility study on 
a proposed nuclear power project in northern Java, awarded to a subsidiary of 
Kansai Power, the second largest Japanese power company, which is also ex- 
pected to receive the contracts to build up to twelve plants in the future (“RI 
Picks Japanese Firm” 199  1). Telecommunications, with forty-three projects, 
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The Indonesians have not ventured as far as the Thais in attempting to privat- 
ize infrastructure development. Nor have they signed on to the New Aid Plan. 
But de facto they are following the objectives of the plan, through the loans 
that Suharto’s government  requests. The Indonesian government  has placed 
infrastructure improvements at the top of the state’s agenda because it is con- 
cerned that Indonesia’s recent export success could founder without it. Many 
state-led industrial projects were not funded in FY 1992, in order to support 
government  infrastructural development  (Stone  1991). Moreover, since 1988 
the government has opened the industrial estate sector to private investors, in- 
cluding foreigners through joint ventures. Two Japanese groups, Marubeni and 
Sumitomo, as well as South Korea’s Hyundai, are currently completing the 
construction of industrial estates outside of Jakarta. The estates are an attempt 
to circumvent the slow-paced upgrading of the infrastructure presently  pro- 
vided by  the government. They have already leased space to numerous Japa- 
nese companies. In addition to these privately owned estates, the Indonesian 
government, in the hopes of attracting foreign investors to the archipelago, has 
poured millions of dollars into the Batam Island Industrial Estate over the last 
several years. It hopes that the land, labor, and infrastructure supplied by  the 
Indonesians, with the aid of  Singaporean management and capital, will pro- 
mote growth and  greater regional  integration  within  ASEAN in  the  Singa- 
porean growth triangle (Batam Industrial Development Authority  199  1). 
The Indonesian construction market, unlike Thailand’s is largely dominated 
by state corporations. Over 80 percent of the construction companies in Indo- 
nesia are owned by the government. This dominance leaves very little room for 
either private  or foreign  contractors in  gaining  market shares in  Indonesia. 
With the exception of the change in industrial estate laws, it is difficult to assess 
whether the Indonesian market will open up in the future. The Indonesian gov- 
ernment seems willing to improve its infrastructure with Japanese aid. But it 
is considerably more hesitant to give foreign contractors a sizable share of the 
contracts. One large industrial project near Jakarta, built by Japanese contrac- 
tors and financed with yen loans, continues to be a source of contention be- 
tween the two  government^.'^ Nationalist backlashes thus have limited Japa- 
nese participation in the Indonesian construction market to under 0.5 percent. 
Approximately twenty Japanese companies are currently working in the Indo- 
nesian construction sector (Informasi: Pusat Data Business Indonesia 199  1). 
Furthermore, foreign contractors are upset with a new law that removes their 
eligibility  for automatic joint venture  status. Instead,  the  government  now 
grants joint venture status to international contractors on a project-by-project 
14.  The Asahan Project, a US$2.7 billion complex that includes dams, power transmission, 
and a giant aluminum smelter exporting ingots to Japan, is 59 percent owned by Japanese interests 
and 41 percent owned by  the Indonesian government. When the yen rose  sharply in  1985, the 
government was unable to pay interest due on loans borrowed to build the plant and pay the con- 
tractors. Even after further loans were extended by Tokyo, the Indonesian government in 1988 for 
a period of five months discontinued exports of the ingots to Japan. See Wysock (2991). 237  Japan as a Regional Power in Asia 
basis. Rules for buying imported construction equipment have been eased but 
still  favor locally made equipment.  Imported  equipment,  according  to law, 
must be sold to either the government or Indonesian contractors when the proj- 
ect is completed  (“New Engine  of  Growth’ 1988). According to numerous 
private sector contractors in Indonesia, the government’s insistence on control 
over infrastructure projects through state-led companies is a major factor im- 
peding the improvement of Indonesia’s infrastructure. They maintain that the 
state is unaware of the needs of industry and often fails to see the links between 
a sound infrastructure and continued industrial SUCC~SS.’~  The liberalization of 
other sectors of the  Indonesian  economy  may eventually  create pressure to 
broaden private participation in the construction sector. But for now the politi- 
cal reasons for holding onto the construction industry, often described as one 
of the government’s cash cows, remain intact. 
In the area of telecommunications both Thailand and Indonesia have taken 
steps toward allowing foreign firms to invest. In Thailand private sector opera- 
tion of telecommunications has expanded enormously since 1988, largely as a 
result of demand surging far beyond the capabilities of the state-run operators 
(Westlake 199  1). Full privatization of the two state-run communications agen- 
cies, the Telephone Authority of Thailand (TOT) and the Communications Au- 
thority  of  Thailand (CAT)-the  latter with strong links to the military-has 
been rejected. But due to a severe shortage of telephone lines and Bangkok’s 
traffic congestion, both have begun to grant concessions to local and foreign 
business for paging and cellular services. In this area Motorola, Ericsson, and 
NEC have been major joint partners in the provision of these services. In ad- 
dition, British Telecom recently won a US$1 billion contract with Charoen 
Pokphand, its Thai partner, to set up and operate two million new telephone 
lines for twenty years. In this initiative a British MNE beat out both NEC and 
Fujitsu for the first major contract. The awarding of this contract to the British 
was widely interpreted as an attempt of the new military government to diver- 
sity investment away from Japan. Thailand already relies heavily upon Japa- 
nese telecommunication equipment suppliers (Handley 1990b). The TOT, for 
example, which handles domestic services, is heavily dependent on Japanese 
foreign borrowings for development projects and must wait for each year’s for- 
eign loan commitments before granting contracts to suppliers. The Japanese 
are also trying to entice Thailand through OECF loans into joining its Sigma 
Project, which began in 1989. This is a plan for working with Asian countries 
to develop a regional, automated software industry to help counter a growing 
labor shortage in Japan (“Automating Software” 1988). 
As in Thailand, Indonesia’s state-run telecommunication agencies, Perumtel 
(which handles domestic calls) and Indosat (which services external communi- 
15.  The most recent example of  this perceived misunderstanding is the tabling of many urgent 
projects in Indonesia so that government contractors could participate in the reconstruction of 
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cations), have  run into major infrastructural bottlenecks. As a consequence, 
the Indonesian government has stepped up annual spending on telecommuni- 
cations to US$600 million (“Competing in Indonesia’s Telecommunications 
Market” 1988).  Japanese OECF money finances a large portion of this invest- 
ment. Many of the orders for purchases of telecommunication equipment have 
gone to Japanese firms as well as their European and American competitors. 
As in Thailand, Japanese foreign aid has been linked to Japanese telecommuni- 
cation suppliers. In Indonesia typically 60-65  percent of telecommunication 
equipment is obtained through local contractors working in cooperation with 
foreign vendors; the rest is produced through a state monopoly working in 
conjunction with Siemens (Hukill and Jussawalla 1989).  The newly introduced 
mobile telephone service uses Motorola’s Advanced Mobile Telephone System 
(AMPS), but the mobile phones are supplied equally by Motorola, NEC, JRC, 
and Ericsson. In January  1991 a major telephone contract to supply digital 
switching equipment for 350,000 lines was  initially awarded to NEC. After 
intervention by  U.S. President Bush and acrimonious debate alleging favorit- 
ism by all parties involved, the contract was doubled, allowing for participation 
by  both NEC and AT&T.  Significant infighting among the members of  Su- 
harto’s family over the selection of Indonesian partners to work with these two 
MNEs also occurred. In the end two companies in the hands of Suharto’s sons 
were chosen after both NEC and AT&T had offered generous finance pack- 
ages. As in the case of  the construction industry, compared to Thailand the 
Indonesians are keeping a tighter grip on the telecommunication industry. The 
large share of  public ownership and the regime’s internal security concerns 
explain this difference. Nevertheless, the Indonesian government realizes the 
extent to which poor telecommunications can handicap economic growth. And 
it has taken significant steps toward improving Indonesia’s telecommunica- 
tions. 
6.4  Japan’s Future Role in Asia and the Regional World Economy 
Japan is at the center of  a new Asian regionalism that is complementing 
rather than replacing the multilateralism that has evolved since 1945. This re- 
gionalism differs from Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in the 
1930s and 1940s. What separates the new from the old regionalism is the dif- 
ference between autarchy and direct rule on the one hand and interdependence 
and influence on the other. 
Greater Asian regional cooperation appears to be an idea whose time has 
come-both  in terms of  the larger public debate and in terms of initiatives 
such as the New Aid Plan and the ASEAN free trade area. Enhanced regional 
cooperation is often invoked as a necessary response to the process of Euro- 
pean integration as well as the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, soon to be 
joined  by  Mexico.  The  Asia  Pacific  Economic  Cooperation  Conference 
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the ASEAN states began to work toward the creation of a common free trade 
zone by early next century. Like the Asian Development Bank, APEC and the 
ASEAN initiatives are providing forums for the discussion of economic policy 
and thus may turn out to be useful for strengthening regional economic cooper- 
ation. 
Japan’s interests in fostering greater Asian cooperation and the responses by 
Indonesia and Thailand can serve as test cases for how questions of regional- 
ism and multilateralism are being negotiated. If Japanese government and busi- 
ness actions, either intentionally or unintentionally, were fostering a shift away 
from multilateralism toward the emergence of a closed form of regionalism in 
Asia, this should be particularly evident in those Asian countries where Japa- 
nese trade, aid, and investment power are strong. While Thailand and Indone- 
sia have both opened their economies to extensive economic relationships with 
Japan, both governments have viewed their involvement with Japanese busi- 
ness largely in multilateral terms. They have welcomed the investment capital, 
technology, and loans provided by  the Japanese as a means of restructuring 
their own economies and of becoming more important and more diversified 
participants in the global trading system. Although Indonesia’s trade and debt 
dependence on Japan has risen while Thailand’s has decreased over the last 
decade, Indonesia’s movement away from a reliance solely on oil exports- 
due in part to the investment by  Japanese MNEs-bodes  well for its attempts 
to diversify its trade patterns in the future. Oil and gas reserves also provide 
Indonesia with valuable leverage and access to a wide variety of  markets. 
Despite the advantages accruing to an open relationship with Japan, the 
sharp growth in Japanese influence and power in these and other Asian coun- 
tries has created some unease about the political consequences of intensifying 
Asian economic relations for an emerging regional political economy.’6  With 
the total GNP of ASEAN amounting to less than 10 percent of Japan’s GNP, a 
world of  self-contained regions in the northern half of the globe would leave 
the ASEAN members highly dependent on Japan. In the view of  Thai and 
Indonesian leaders as well as other Asian countries, only the United States can 
act as an indispensable counterweight to Japan’s growing power. 
This is perhaps one reason why there has, as of yet, been no substantive 
move toward an Asia-wide free trade agreement similar to those negotiated in 
North America and Europe. When in the wake of the suspension of the Uru- 
guay Round of GATT negotiations in December 1990 Malaysia’s Prime Minis- 
ter Mahathir proposed that Asian nations form a regional trading bloc that 
would exclude North America, his suggestion was promptly dismissed by the 
Japanese government and others within the region  (Sanger 1991a). At  the 
ASEAN ministerial meeting in July 1991, Mahathir’s continuing attempts to 
promote his East Asian economic group sparked interest among the ASEAN 
16.  Rumor has it that the best way for ASEAN academics to get a free trip to Japan these days 
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partners only when the proposal was watered down by referring to it merely as 
a “consultative forum.” Despite the growth of economic regionalism in Asia, 
few Asian nations-most  notably the Japanese-want  to upset their relation- 
ship with North America and Europe, on whom they depend so heavily for 
trade and investment. Asian nations still export well over a third of their prod- 
ucts to the North American market. And Asian trade is significantly less inter- 
dependent than trade within the European  community. The chapters in this 
volume written by Frankel, Ito, Petri, and Saxonhouse all reinforce this conclu- 
sion. Furthermore, while expanding rapidly during the last few years, Japanese 
investment to other Asian nations still lags significantly behind Japanese in- 
vestment  in  Europe  and,  especially,  North  America.  To  date, the  desire to 
maintain open lines to the United States and Europe is not yet incompatible 
with a stepped-up economic and increasingly political role for the Japanese in 
Asia, particularly among the ASEAN nations. 
With the American navy firmly committed to retaining a strong position in 
Asia and with the consolidation of U.S.-Japanese security arrangements in the 
1980s,  the United States is likely to remain an Asian power. Furthermore, since 
virtually all Asian countries, including Thailand and Indonesia, run a substan- 
tial trade  deficit with Japan and a large surplus with the  United  States, the 
United States is essential for regional economic integration in Asia. An Asia 
that includes the United States has several virtues. It can diffuse the economic 
and political dependencies of the smaller Asian states away from Japan. And 
it can provide Japan with the national security that makes unnecessary a major 
arms buildup and the hostile political  reaction  it would engender among Ja- 
pan’s neighbors. 
The case studies of Thai and Indonesian responses to Japanese interests sug- 
gest that Asia is not heading toward a Japanese-led  autarchic order. Japanese 
efforts to improve infrastructure under the aegis of  the New  Aid Plan have 
encountered major political obstacles in both Thailand and Indonesia. Further- 
more, where infrastructure has been built, it is serving to strengthen not only 
Japanese capital, but domestic, East Asian, and U.S. capital as well. 
In addition to the numerous difficulties encountered with the New Aid Plan 
in Indonesia and Thailand, Japan’s increasing power is limited in two further 
ways. First, the structure of Japanese politics makes the articulation of a clear- 
cut view of  Japan’s role in global politics much less compelling than the cre- 
ation of points of political leverage to counter Japan’s numerous vulnerabilities. 
The criticisms levied against Japan in the wake of the Gulf War and anticipa- 
tion of  the substantial political changes that the end of the Cold War might 
bring about in Asia are providing a strong impetus for Japan’s political leader- 
ship to remedy that shortcoming. International crises during the interwar years 
and the experience of World War I1 jolted the United States out of its isolation- 
ist stance. Crises of similar magnitude may do the same for Japan. But short 
of cataclysmic changes, Japan’s leaders are likely to experience great difficult- 
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and of  creating structures that reduce Japan’s vulnerability by enhancing the 
vulnerabilities  of  others. The investment strategy of  Japanese corporations, 
coupled with their technological  dynamism, is very likely to drive political 
developments in the future, rather than the articulation and implementation of 
a political vision for Japan’s future global role. 
Second,  political  constraints,  both  domestic  and  international,  militate 
against a dramatic rise in Japan’s military power. Some shrill voices (magnified 
by American publishers with a good instinct for what it takes to sell books in 
Tokyo) talk of “the coming war with Japan” (Friedman and Lebard 1991). But 
hardly anyone in Asia or the United States takes such talk seriously at this time. 
Public sentiment among Japanese citizens and among the leaders of  Japan’s 
neighboring countries will continue to provide a check on the resurgence of 
the Japanese military.  l7 The real change since the late 1970s, however, is rather 
a gradual Japanese military buildup that is creating technological options for a 
national strategy that did not exist ten or twenty years ago. But as long as Japan 
is not developing interballistic  missiles, stealth technologies,  and offensive, 
conventional military power in Asia on a large scale, we can be reasonably 
certain that Japan will operate within the political limits that it has imposed on 
its exercise of military power since 1945. This is hardly a surprise. Japanese 
policymakers define national security in comprehensive terms, to include eco- 
nomic, social, and political issues besides military considerations  (Langdon 
1976; Kurth 1990). They are thus much more attuned to finding an appropriate 
political role for Japan rather than to seeking to develop national military op- 
tions in a world marked by decreasing international tensions. Playing a central, 
perhaps the central, role in an Asia that is defined broadly to encompass also 
the United States is a far more urgent and appealing task. 
Japan’s approach to international partners expresses a vision of national se- 
curity rooted in political harmony, economic prosperity, and social stability 
rather than military preeminence. This vision is grounded in a notion of eco- 
nomic partnerships constituting an international society of states. According to 
this view, what holds the world together is not common norms that tie different 
nations together in common endeavors. Instead the world is governed by inter- 
ests. International cooperation is made possible by the flexibility of redefining 
short-term interest into long-term interests. This ability to redefine interests 
presupposes a willingness to extend the notion of “self” to incorporate at least 
some relevant portions of  the “other,” so that the expectation of  an ongoing 
interest-based  relationship  is met (Hamaguchi 1985). In the  1990s Japan is 
likely to extend and deepen its traditional approach to its international partners 
17.  The abortive attempt by  the Japanese government to send a peace support group to the 
Persian Gulf and Japan’s refusal to  participate in joint military exercises with Thailand at the re- 
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in Asia. And it may choose to invest in global institutions and policies to help 
Japan play a larger role in Asia. Asian regionalism is likely to retain strong 
multilateral and global colors. 
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Comment  Wing Thye Woo 
This is an excellent paper. I agree with its conclusion that the bilateral relation- 
ship between Japan and its Asian neighbors will be embedded in a set of multi- 
lateral regional  and  global arrangements that will  also include the United 
States. East and Southeast Asia is definitely not heading toward a Japanese-led 
autarchic regional order. Japan will not become the regional hegemon because 
(1) it does not want to do so presently; and (2) most of its Asian neighbors do 
not want to develop the kind of close bilateral relationship that would allow it 
to do so. 
There are at least two important reasons not mentioned by Peter Katzenstein 
and Martin Rouse about why Japan does not want to be the regional hegemon. 
The first is that Japan approximates a country of  peaceniks. Skeptics of this 
claim need only recall the domestic outcry when the prime minister wanted to 
send a Japanese noncombatant contingent to the Iraq conflict. 
The second reason is that the benefits of  being the regional hegemon are 
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exceeded by the costs of antagonizing the United States and Western Europe. 
The U.S. and Western European  markets are far bigger than the Southeast 
Asian markets. This fact explains Japan’s quick disassociation from the pro- 
posal by the Malaysian prime minister to form an exclusively East Asian trad- 
ing community. 
On the other side, there are two major reasons why Japan’s neighbors do not 
want it to be the regional hegemon. The first is that they recognize the benefits 
of having multiple patrons. The strategy of playing one power against another 
during the Cold War is a proven winner. 
The second reason, which was hinted at by Katzenstein and Rouse but was 
not developed, is that memories of World War I1 have created an atmosphere 
of suspicion toward Japan by  its neighbors. These suspicions in the case of 
China verge on animosity. This is why Hirohito was never invited to China 
even though he had hinted many times to visiting Chinese officials that he 
would like to walk on the Great Wall. The Chinese reaction, according to the 
Beijing grapevine, was that this is exactly what the Great Wall is for-to  keep 
out people like this. 
To  see how widespread the suspicions about Japan are, we  should recall 
what happened  in  1974 when Tanaka visited Southeast Asia. His visit was 
marred by big riots in Bangkok, Jakarta, and Manila. These riots occurred for 
domestic reasons, but Japan bashing provided an acceptable excuse to riot. 
These acts of patriotism were actually shows of defiance to the domestic dicta- 
tors (Marcos in the Philippines, Soeharto in Indonesia, and Thanom Kittika- 
chorn in Thailand). 
The interesting question is why internal dissent was able to masquerade as 
patriotic acts. The answer is that the governing elite in  1974 in these three 
countries had in their youth been traumatized by  the extreme brutality with 
which Japan rampaged through Southeast Asia during World War 11. For ex- 
ample, General Yamashita earned the title of the Tiger of Malaya when he 
systematically shot all the people that had anything to do with the propagation 
of Chinese language or Chinese culture. (Yamashita was later transferred to 
the Philippines, where he ordered the Bataan Death March.) 
Memories of acts like this explain why Lee Kuan Yew  (with the implicit 
agreement of Malaysia and Indonesia) has offered military facilities in Singa- 
pore to the United States to replace its loss of the Subic Bay naval facility. This 
action came from Lee Kuan Yew’s and Soeharto’s recognition that Japan would 
immediately rearm if there were any threats to oil tankers traveling through 
Southeast Asian waters. Both leaders preferred U.S. warships rather than Japa- 
nese warships to do the patrolling. 
Lee Kuan Yew  and Soeharto are just fearful of Japan rearming if it were 
to become the regional hegemon. To paraphrase Lee Kuan Yew,  the Japanese 
have an obsession with perfection-nothing  but the best. The idea of a second- 
rate military force that is poorly armed just goes against the national grain. A 
rearmed Japan will be a nuclear Japan, and this, in Lee Kuan Yew’s words, “is 246  Peter J. Katzenstein and Martin Rouse 
like giving chocolate liqueur to an alcoholic.” Both Lee Kuan Yew  and Soe- 
harto want America to have continued strong economic interests in Southeast 
Asia in the hope of producing the following division of labor: America to con- 
tinue  the  management  of  regional  security,  and  Japan  to  develop  high- 
definition television to perfection. 
So far, I have developed the case that an important impediment to Japan’s 
becoming the regional hegemon is painful historical memories about Japan. 
The question now is whether this impediment can be removed to speed up the 
progress of Asian-Japanese bilateral relationships. The answer to this question 
is the same as the answer Paul Samuelson gave when he was asked how prog- 
ress is made in economics: progress is always made funeral by funeral. 
The other Asians’ suspicion of Japan will naturally fade out over time. To 
give an example, the Japanese embassy in Jakarta, in preparation for the em- 
peror’s visit, invited a group of prominent Indonesians for individual conversa- 
tions. The question the Japanese embassy asked of  their guests was whether 
the emperor should apologize for the World War I1 atrocities. The responses 
by the Indonesians coincided very nicely with their age group. 
Those above fifty years old gave James Joycean answers: “Apologize, apolo- 
gize or the eagles will pull out your eyes.” Those under fifty years old felt that 
an apology was not necessary if the emperor would announce a big increase in 
development aid. 
I maintain that the Japanese awareness of this historical memory variable 
plays a large part in formulating the basic Japanese vision of “national security 
rooted in political harmony, economic prosperity, and social stability” (section 
6.4) rather than in political hegemony. 
This excellent paper is unfortunately blemished in several places by  poor 
use of  economic theory and an overly suspicious tone. The most prominent 
examples of faulty theory follow. 
In section 6.2.2, the authors attribute the import-substitution industrializa- 
tion programs of the 1960s to the absence of “private international credit.” I do 
not see the economic reason for this claim. Taiwan hardly borrowed in the 
1960s, yet its industrialization program was export-oriented rather than import- 
substitution-oriented.  “The fact that access to international capital could be 
obtained only through multinational enterprises (MNEs)” does not dictate that 
industrialization will be import-substituting. The MNEs will come to exploit 
whatever profit opportunities the government creates. They came in the 1960s 
when tariffs made it profitable to produce for the domestic markets, and they 
came in the 1980s when export-promoting policies (actually, industrial deregu- 
lation) made it profitable to use these countries as manufacturing bases. Since 
the authors are well aware of the latter too (see section 6.2.2), I am puzzled by 
their claim of a link between imperfect credit markets and import-substitution 
industrialization. 
The authors write that in the aftermath of  the second oil shock, “the Thai 
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Fund (IMF) to initiate austerity measures.” Shouldn’t it be “advised” rather 
than “pressured”? Why do the authors wish to imply that the IMF’s action was 
detrimental to Thailand’s welfare? The only choices the Thai government had 
were either take the IMF loans and implement the austerity programs, or forgo 
the IMF loans and still implement the austerity programs. The authors surely 
cannot be saying that the second choice would have been better than the first. 
In section 6.3 the authors conclude from the “lack of coordination arising 
from Chatchai’s rapid privatization of infrastructure, without any government 
planning and regulation, . . . that the market may not be the best system for 
upgrading infrastructure.” But then, the authors had just noted that in the pre- 
Chatichai period there had “been major problems with many of  the projects 
. . . ,  due largely to a lack of  coordination among the various road and mass 
transit projects as well as interministerial conflicts.” Since the authors make no 
claim that the Chatchai period was more chaotic, the only permissible conclu- 
sion from both observations is that neither market coordination nor bureau- 
cratic coordination works. 
I find the authors too quick to sound suspicious about Japanese investment 
and infrastructure aid in the following cases. 
“But Indonesia’s ability to get its economy back on track [since 19831 has 
come at the price of increased dependence on foreign investment, particularly 
Japanese” (section 6.2.2). I do not see the negative aspects suggested by the 
word price, because the final outcome was mutually advantageous, as the au- 
thors observe in the final sentence of the same paragraph. They also noted 
earlier that “Japan’s increasing economic involvement in the region has been 
encouraged by almost all governments in Southeast Asia” (section 6.1). 
I do not follow how documentation of growing Japanese investment in Thai- 
land and Indonesia could have led to the conclusion that “Japan has indeed 
been acting as a regional economic hegemon” (section 6.2.2). Up to that point, 
the authors have presented no examples of how Japan has used its investments 
to influence public policies in these countries. Being a hegemon is more than 
simply being the biggest  foreign investor. The hegemon conclusion  should 
have been drawn only after the section on infrastructure investment, and even 
then would still be debatable. 
The authors emphasize that the Japanese have not been truly altruistic be- 
cause “loans for the alleviation of  rural poverty . . . are infrequent” (section 
6.3). Let us ask ourselves, Has the Japanese (and other foreign donors’ and 
investors’) way of getting the Indonesian economy back on track since 1983 
been either bad or negligible for Indonesian welfare, particularly for rural pov- 
erty? The evidence is a resounding no. The Japanese and other foreigners in 
the pursuit of their self-interests have created a more export-oriented economy 
that, throughout the period of  structural adjustment, has caused the poverty 
rate to fall, raised the real wages of rural and urban workers, and increased the 
caloric intake of the poorest 40 percent of the population. 
Let me conclude with what I see to be the biggest flaw in this paper. It is 248  Peter J. Katzenstein and Martin Rouse 
quite remarkable that the possibility of Japan’s becoming the hegemon of East 
Asia was analyzed without any reference to the other East Asian giant, China. 
Obviously, depending on economic growth in China, Japan may not want to 
assert itself as the regional hegemon. Moreover, Japan may not be able to as- 
sume that role even if  it desires to. The recent establishment  of diplomatic 
relations between China and South Korea (or equivalently, the jettisoning of 
North Korea by China and Taiwan by South Korea) reveals well the moves that 
are afoot by Japan’s neighbors to prevent Japan from assuming such a position. 
There can be no autarchic regional order without the consent of China, least 
of all a Japanese-led one. 
The authors’ neglect of China led to  two misstatements in the paper. The 
first is the claim that “it is difficult to envision a counterweight to Japanese 
power in Asia”  (section 6.1). The second misstatement is the claim that the 
most important factor behind the decline in Japanese investment (and foreign 
investment, in general) in Thailand and Indonesia since 1990 is the inadequacy 
of their infrastructure. At least as important is that Japanese, Taiwanese, and 
Korean investments have been pouring into the lower-wage alternative, China, 
instead. President Bush’s repeated vetoes of congressional efforts to remove 
China’s most-favored-nation  status has restored confidence in China as a suit- 
able manufacturing base. 